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ABSTRACT: The objective of this study is to explore the impact of uncertain interdependencies on the
resilience assessment of infrastructure systems. Existing models for analyzing interdependent infrastruc-
tures do not account for the underlying uncertainties in the strength and type of interdependent relations.
Taking these into account, this paper proposes a probabilistic framework to assess the serviceability of
interdependent infrastructures. A preliminary analysis is presented focused on the uncertainty of physical
interdependencies. The case study reveals that the strength of a physical interdependency increases as the
distance between the interconnected components increases. Accounting for the uncertainty in the inter-
depndencies results in larger differences in the mean functionality of network components as the physical
interdependency strength increases.
1. INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructures, such as water supply sys-
tems and power grids, are essential to the society
and the economy. When the operations of these in-
frastructures are impaired by extreme events, com-
mercial activities and the day-to-day life of local
residents are severely disrupted. Examples of such
events include the 2003 North American blackout
and the 2017 disastrous flooding in Houston that
rendered multiple infrastructure systems inoperable
resulting in cascading effects throughout multiple
economic sectors and through the community. A
particular challenge in assess the impact of such
events on infrastructure lies in understanding the
influence of interdependencies on the performance
of the infrastructure system before, during, and af-
ter a disruption. Driven by the development of so-
cial economy and advances in technology, infras-
tructure systems are becoming increasingly inter-
connected (Pederson et al., 2006). Although inter-
dependencies between infrastructures can improve
the overall efficiency and robustness during normal
operations, these interdependencies can make in-
frastructure systems more vulnerable to disruptive
events due to the cascading effect of losses and fail-
ures (Buldyrev et al., 2010; Bashan et al., 2013;
Ouyang, 2014; Danziger et al., 2016). For example,
damage to the power grid can cascade into the water
supply system as pumping stations fail due to loss
of power, and the lack of water for cooling can then
impact the generation of electricity. As such, inter-
dependencies among infrastructures must be taken
into account to understand the operational charac-
teristics of infrastructure systems (Rinaldi, 2004),
in order to develop more robust and resilient sys-
tems, ensure rapid recovery after disruptive events,
and reduce economic loss (Zhang et al., 2018).
Interdependency refers to "the bidirectional rela-
tionship between two infrastructures through which
the state of each infrastructure influences or is cor-
related to the state of the other" (Rinaldi et al.,
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2001). Rinaldi et al. (2001) formalize the con-
cept of infrastructure interdependency and propose
a classification of different types of interdependen-
cies. Later, other classifications of interdependen-
cies between infrastructure systems have also been
proposed (Zimmerman, 2001; Lee II et al., 2007;
Dudenhoeffer et al., 2006). This study adopts the
classification of Rinaldi et al. (2001) and focuses
on the physical and geographic interdependencies
between the water and electricity systems. A phys-
ical interdependency arises between two networks
when a commodity produced or modified by one
infrastructure (an output) is required by another in-
frastructure for it to operate (an input). Geographi-
cal interdependency occurs if a local event can im-
pact the sate of components of different infrastruc-
ture systems that are located in close proximity (Ri-
naldi et al., 2001).
The proposed approach for modeling the re-
silience of interdependent infrastructure systems
under uncertainty considers the effect of both haz-
ard and interdependency strength on the perfor-
mance of power and water systems. The remain-
der of this paper is organized as follows, Section 2
provides a brief literature review on existing work
in infrastructure interdependency modeling, in Sec-
tion 3 the modeling approach is presented with the
case study described in Section 4 and results in Sec-
tion 5. Concluding remarks are provided in Section
6.
2. BACKGROUND
To model the interdependencies among critical in-
frastructure systems, several methods have been de-
veloped, including agent-based approaches (Bar-
ton et al., 2000), graph-based approaches (Wal-
lace et al., 2001; Dueñas-Osorio, 2005; Xu et al.,
2007; Holden et al., 2013; Milanovic and Zhu,
2018), Leontief input-output approaches (Haimes
and Jiang, 2001), and Bayesian networks-based
approaches (Di Giorgio and Liberati, 2012; Jo-
hansen and Tien, 2018), among others. Among
these methods, the graph-based approach is more
commonly used to model interdependent infrastruc-
tures because of the networked nature of these sys-
tems (Dueñas-Osorio et al., 2007) and the conve-
nience to extend this approach to model the restora-
tion process (Lee II et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2012).
This work adopts the graph-based approach to ex-
plore the physical and geographic interdependen-
cies.
Prior work on the interdependency between wa-
ter and electric power systems considers a proba-
bilistic assessment of the earthquake-induced dam-
age of a municipal water system, taking into ac-
count the dependence of the water system func-
tionality on the availability of electrical power and
the uncertainty about earthquake intensity and com-
ponent fragility (Adachi and Ellingwood, 2008).
In the study of Dueñas-Osorio et al. (2007), int-
edependencies among network components are es-
tablished by spatial proximity. Later, González
et al. (2017) extend the work using an optimization
model for recovery management by incorporating
both the physical and geographic interdependen-
cies between infrastructure systems, specifically the
physical interdependency between the power net-
work and the gas and water networks, and the ge-
ographical interdependency between the gas and
the water networks. Existing work in the litera-
ture has not so far accounted for the uncertainties
about interdependencies, which may lead to an un-
derestimation of the vulnerability of the interdepen-
dent infrastructures. This paper develops an ap-
proach that models the uncertainty within the inter-
dependencies to assess the resilience of infrastruc-
ture systems under different levels of interdepen-
dency strengths. The resilience is evaluated based
on the serviceability of the two networks after a dis-
ruption.
To evaluate the serviceability of interdependent
infrastructure systems, several sources of uncertain-
ties need to be considered. First, components are
widely distributed over the service area and expe-
rience various levels of damages when subject to
the same disruptive event. The lack of data of-
ten poses the biggest challenge for deterministic
models (Rinaldi, 2004). Without adequate knowl-
edge about component characteristics (and conse-
quently the randomness in the intensities of disrup-
tive events at the location of each component), the
fragility of each component is uncertain. Further,
due to the dynamic nature of the relations between
2
13th International Conference on Applications of Statistics and Probability in Civil Engineering, ICASP13
Seoul, South Korea, May 26-30, 2019
infrastructure systems, the type and strength of in-
terdependencies are probabilistic. As the topology
of infrastructure systems evolves over time during
the recovery , the interdependencies are not static
as damaged components are restored and new com-
ponents might be added temporally to enhance the
recovery rate. However, dynamic data during the
recovery process is expensive to collect. As a re-
sult, a probabilistic analysis of the performance of
infrastructures in the presence of uncertain interde-
pendencies is essential in order to i) assess the im-
pact of extreme events on interdependencies, and
ii) model the influence of interdependencies on the
performance of infrastructure systems during the
recovery process.
3. MODELING APPROACH
This study focuses on the analysis of the ser-
viceability of water supply and electric power
infrastructure with consideration of both hazard-
related and interdependency-related failures.
Physical interdependency is included and modeled
in a probabilistic manner. Monte Carlo simulation
is employed to reveal how the probabilistic failures
on the component level propagate through the
system. The proposed methodology is illustrated
through a case study of the water and electric
power systems in Shelby County, Tennessee, USA.
The assessment of component functionality ratio
and system serviceability is carried out using Monte
Carlo simulation illustrated in Fig.1 and following
the algorithm described below.
1. Simulate the natural hazard scenario.
2. Compute the intensity of the natural hazard at
the location of each network component.
3. Calculate the probability of failure for each
component of the network. A vector p is used
to represent the failure probabilities for the
components. For simplicity, components are
assumed to be inoperable once they are dam-
aged, i.e., partial functionality is not consid-
ered.
4. Generate a random vector u (u ∼ U(0,1)) of
correlated hazard intensities at each of the sites
within the network. If the failure probability of
a certain component is greater than the random
number drawn from U(0,1), then it is assumed
to be inoperable .
5. Generate the network consisting of the func-
tional components only. The generated net-
work is a subgraph of the network before the
disruption.
6. Apply the Floyd-Warshall algorithm to detect
demand components that are still connected to
the supply nodes. This algorithm calculates
the shortest path between all pairs of nodes si-
multaneously. If at least one path exists from
a demand node to a source node, then the de-
mand node is considered to be functional. Oth-
erwise, the component is considered inopera-
ble. The serviceability of the system is defined
by the ratio of functional demand nodes.
7. Repeat steps 3-5 for a sufficient number of it-
erations, N, to evaluate the component func-
tionality rate and the average network service-
ability. The functionality ratio of the demand





In Eq. 1, Xi describes the number of simula-
tions in which demand node i remains func-
tional and is divided by the total number of
simulations. The mean serviceability of the
system, S̄, is calculated using Eq. 2 where Si





The modeling approach provides a comprehen-
sive methodology that addresses multiple sources
of uncertainty that affect the performance of infras-
tructure networks. In this particular paper, the fo-
cus is on the calculation of the probability of failure
and the corresponding serviceability and function-
ality ratio. In particular, the work provides a model
that accounts for the hazard intensity as well as the
interdependency strength in the calculation of the
component’s probability of failure. In this paper,
only physical interdependencies are considered.
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Figure 1: Modeling approach for the infrastructure
serviceability assessment under uncertainty
4. CASE STUDY
This section summarizes a real world case study
used to illustrate the modeling approach outlined in
Section 3.
4.1. Interdependent infrastructure Systems
The case study considers the water and electric
power systems in Shelby County, Tennessee where
Memphis is located. Both systems are governed by
the same utility company, Memphis Light, Gas, and
Water, the largest three-service utility company in
the US serving close to one million customers. The
layout of the two systems is depicted in Fig.2. The
water distribution network includes 6 elevated stor-
age tanks, 9 pumping stations, 34 intermediate de-
livery nodes, and 71 water pipes while the power
grid consists of 14 gate stations, 23 23-kV sub-
stations, and 23 12-kV substations. Gate stations
and pumping stations are considered as the sup-
ply facilities while the substations and intermedi-
ate delivery nodes are considered as demand facil-
ities (Adachi and Ellingwood, 2008). It should be
noted that intermediate delivery nodes are the inter-
section points of water pipes and they are assumed
to be undamaged after earthquakes since there are
no large-scale facilities at the site of these nodes.
Since the electric power system does not have gen-
erators within Shelby County, which requires wa-
ter for cooling and is thus dependent on the wa-
ter distribution system, only physical dependency
of pumping stations on the closest power stations is
considered.
Figure 2: Layout of power and water systems
4.2. Hazard Intensity
While Shelby County is subject to a wide range of
hazards including earthquakes, flooding, and thun-
derstorms, the extreme event for this case study is
assumed to be an earthquake of magnitude, MW ,
equal to 7.7 which is the maximum probable earth-
quake for the New Madrid Seismic Zone according
to Harmsen et al. (2003). The epicenter of the max-
imum probable earthquake is located at 35.3N and
90.3W. The distance from the epicenter to the com-
ponents of two infrastructure systems, R, ranges
from 20 km to 65 km. The seismic intensity is typi-
cally characterized by the median Peak Ground Ac-
celeration (PGA) or Peak Ground Velocity (PGV),
whose logarithmic (base 10) values can be calcu-
lated using Eqs. 3 and 4, respectively (Adachi and
Ellingwood, 2009). The median PGA values in
Shelby County are shown in Fig.3.
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Figure 3: Median PGA in Shelby County (Yu et al.)
4.3. Component Fragility
Given the seismic intensity, the failure probabil-
ity of infrastructure components can be determined.
The failure probability of nodes given seismic in-
tensity is dependent on the type of facility and the
damage state. A total of five damage states are de-
fined, including none (ds1), minor (ds2), moderate
(ds3), extensive (ds4), and complete (ds5) (FEMA,
2013). As an example, the fragility curve for above
ground steel tank entering different damage states
is shown in Fig.4. In this study, damage state V
is adopted. The failure probability, i.e. the condi-
Figure 4: Fragility curve for above ground steel
tank (FEMA, 2013)
tional probability of exceeding the complete dam-
age state given median values of PGA, is defined
by Eq. 5 (FEMA, 2013)






In Eq. 5, Pn(PGA) describes the probability of fail-
ure of each node given the corresponding median
PGA value; λ is the logarithmic mean value of PGA
(measured in the gravitational acceleration g), at
which the facility exceeds the threshold of complete
damage state; ζ describes the standard deviation of
ln(PGA); φ is the standard normal cumulative dis-
tribution function. Values of λ and ζ vary with the
type of facilities, Table 1. Values of λ and ζ for
water distribution facilities are determined accord-
ing to FEMA (2013). Due to lack of data, values of
λ and ζ for electric power stations are determined
in such a way that their failure probabilities are in
the same order of magnitude to water distribution
facilities.
Table 1: Values of λ and ζ for different facilities
Parameter λ ζ
Storage tank ln(1.5) 0.8
Pumping station ln(1.2) 0.6
Gate station ln(1.2) 0.4
23-kV Substation ln(1.3) 0.4
12-kV Substation ln(1.4) 0.4
The failure probability of a link in the infrastruc-
ture network is determined by the average number
of failures per 1000 feet of link length, i.e. the re-
pair rate, RR, and the median value of PGV . RR
can be calculated by Eq. 6 (American Lifelines Al-
liance, 2001)
RR = K×a×PGV (6)
This equation is originally derived for water pipes,
however, it is assumed to be applicable to power
transmission links with different value of a and K.
For water pipes, a = 0.002 and K = 0.5 while for
power transmission lines, a = 0.001 and K = 0.5.
The number of failures, Nl , is assumed to follow
a Poisson distribution, thus the failure probability
of a link, Pl , can be expressed as a function of the
repair rate and the link length, L, as shown in Eq. 7.
Pl = 1−P [Nl = 0] = 1− exp(−RR×L) (7)
Ideally, as the seismic intensity varies along a link,
the corresponding difference in the failure probabil-
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ity should be taken into account. In order to mini-
mize computational effort and without loss of gen-
erality, the link is equally divided to m segments.
For this case study, m = 20. The failure of different
segments are considered to be independent. The re-
pair ratio for each segment is then computed using
the PGV value at the center of each segment. Then,
the failure probability of a link is approximately de-
termined using Eq. 8 where RRi is the repair ratio
of segment i.












Interdependency strength between system A and
system B is measured using the conditional failure
probability of system A given the failure of system
B, Eq. 9.
Ist = P(failure of A | failure of B) (9)
The strength of interdependency, Ist, is tuned by
changing the value of a in Eq. 6.
4.5. Component Functionality
To evaluate the mean functionality of components,
5000 Monte Carlo simulation runs are performed.
The mean functionality of intermediate delivery
nodes is considered since it can be used to deter-
mine the system performance, such as how much
water can be provided to the end customers in
Shelby County.
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Results of infrastructure resilience assessment are
explored in this section. In particular, interde-
pendency strength and functional ratio are eval-
uated. The impact of distance between compo-
nents on the physical interdependency strength is
shown in Fig. 5. The strength of physical inter-
dependency increases as the distance between the
dependent components is larger. This trend holds
true for multiple levels of hazard intensity. As the
hazard becomes more intense, the physical inter-
dependency becomes stronger as components are
further away from each other. However, the rate
at which the physical interdependency increases
Figure 5: Strength of interdependence vs. distance (I0
represents the initial hazard intensity)
becomes slower. This particular observation may
not hold true for other types of interdependencies,
pointing to the need of modeling the uncertainty
and dynamic of interdependent connection between
infrastructure systems. For example, it is likely that
the strength of geographical interdependencies will
decrease as a function of the distance between com-
ponents.
In the next step, the effect of physical interde-
pendency over the functionality ratio of intermedi-
ate delivery nodes is explored. Figure. 6 shows the
difference in the functionality ratio of the water sys-
tem’s nodes before and after accounting for physi-
cal interdependency. This figure indicates that all
the intermediate delivery nodes of the water distri-
bution system show a decrease in their mean func-
tionality after incorporating the impact of physi-
cal interdependency on the electric power system.
For all intermediate delivery nodes, the difference
is larger with the increase of physical interdepen-
dency strength. Another observation is that the dif-
ference caused by physical interdependency ranges
widely. Node 38, 41 and 49 have the highest differ-
ence in the functionality ratio and can be the most
influenced by the physical interdependency. This
large difference can be attributed to the limited path
to the supply and the relatively large distance of the
pumping stations for these nodes to the power sta-
tions.
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Figure 6: Difference in functionality by node (Ist0
represents the initial strength of physical
interdependency)
6. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a probabilistic framework for
assessing the resilience of power and water sys-
tems with consideration of the uncertainty associ-
ated with the interdependent connections between
the two networks. The case study reveals that the
strength of physical interdependency increases with
the distance between the interconnected compo-
nents. Given the requisite data, this method can be
applied to other independent infrastructure systems.
The outcome of this work can assist risk man-
agers and decision makers in identifying vulnerable
components and inform prioritization of resourca
allocation before, during, and after a disaster. The
ability to account for uncertainty in modeling the
resilience of interdependent infrastructure systems
improves the performance assessment of these net-
works and the corresponding impact of potential
disruptions.
Future work will consider the extension to model
the restoration process and the impact of capacity
redundancy in determining the strength of physical
interdependency.
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